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The Paillier’s Cryptosystem and Some Variants Revisited
Zhengjun Cao1, Lihua Liu2,∗
Abstract. At Eurocrypt’99, Paillier presented a public-key cryptosystem based on a
novel computational problem. It has interested many researchers because it was addi-
tively homomorphic. In this paper, we show that there is a big difference between the
original Paillier’s encryption and some variants. The Paillier’s encryption can be natu-
rally transformed into a signature scheme but these variants miss the feature. In partic-
ular, we simplify the alternative decryption procedure of Bresson-Catalano-Pointcheval
encryption scheme proposed at Asiacrypt’03. The new version is more applicable to
cloud computing because of its double trapdoor decryption mechanism and its flexibil-
ity to be integrated into other cryptographic schemes. It captures a new feature that
its two groups of secret keys can be distributed to different users so as to enhance the
robustness of key management.
Keywords. Additively homomorphic encryption; Paillier’s cryptosystem; double trap-
door decryption; robustness of key management.
1 Introduction
Homomorphic encryption is a very useful cryptographic primitive because it can translate an op-
eration on the ciphertexts into an operation on the underlying plaintexts. The property is very
important for many applications, such as e-voting, threshold cryptosystems, watermarking and se-
cret sharing schemes. For example, if an additively homomorphic encryption is used in an e-voting
scheme, one can obtain an encryption of the sum of all ballots from their encryption. Conse-
quently, it becomes possible that a single decryption will reveal the result of the election. That is,
it is unnecessary to decrypt all ciphertexts one by one.
At Eurocrypt’99, Paillier [15] proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on a novel computa-
tional problem. It encrypts a message m by
E(m, r) = gmrn mod n2,
where n = pq is an RSA modulus, g is a public parameter such that n | ordn2(g), and r is a random
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pad. The encryption function E(m, r) has the additively homomorphic property, i.e.,
E(m1, r1)E(m2, r2) = E(m1 +m2, r1r2).
More powerful, who knows the trapdoor of the encryption function can recover not only the message
m but also the random pad r. This is another appreciated property for many applications. Due
to this property, the Paillier’s encryption scheme can be naturally transformed into a one-way
trapdoor permutation and a digital signature scheme.
Related Work. In 1984, Goldwasser and Micali [11] proposed the first probabilistic encryption
scheme which was also homomorphic. It has been improved in [13, 14]. In 1999, Paillier [15]
presented a novel additively homomorphic encryption which was more powerful because it can
recover the random pad r as well as the message m. At PKC’01, Damg˚ard and Jurik [7] put forth
a generalization of Paillier’s encryption using computations modulo ni(i ≥ 2) and taking a special
base g = n+1. They [8] also investigated the applications of the generalization. The elliptic curve
variant of Paillier’s cryptosystem is due to Galbraith [9].
In 2001, Choi et al. [3] revisited the Paillier’s encryption by taking a special base g such that
gλ = 1+nmod n2, where λ = lcm(p−1, q−1). Shortly after that, Sakurai and Takagi [16] pointed
out that the variant cannot resist a chosen ciphertext attack which can factor the modulus n by
only one query to the decryption oracle.
At Eurocrypt’06, Schoenmakers and Tuyls [17] have considered the problem of converting a
given Paillier’s encryption of a value x ∈ Zn into Paillier’s encryptions of the bits of x. At Eu-
rocrypt’13, Joye and Libert [12] obtained another generalization based on 2k-th power residue
problem. In 2013, Boneh et al. [1] considered the problem of private database queries using Pail-
lier’s homomorphic encryption. At Asiacrypt’ 14, Catalano et al. [6] presented an instantiation
of publicly verifiable delegation of computation on outsourced ciphertext which supports Paillier’s
encryption. In 2015, Castagnos and Laguillaumie [5] designed a linearly homomorphic encryption
scheme whose security relies on the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. Their scheme
is somehow similar to the one of [2]. The Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme [10] relies
on hard problems related to lattices, which actually allows to evaluate any function on messages
given their ciphertexts. But Paillier’s cryptosystem based on the problem of factoring RSA integers
is still more competitive for applications that need only to add ciphertexts.
Our contributions. In this paper, we revisit the Paillier’s cryptosystem and reaffirm that the
Paillier’s encryption can be naturally transformed into a signature scheme but some variants miss
the feature. Our presentation of the cryptosystem and some variants is so plain and heuristic that
it becomes possible to investigate the further applications of these schemes in different scenarios.
In particular, we simplify the alternative decryption procedure of Bresson-Catalano-Pointcheval
encryption scheme. Our new proposal is more applicable to cloud computing because of its double
trapdoor decryption mechanism and its flexibility to be integrated into other cryptographic schemes.
It captures a new feature that its two groups of secret parameters can be allocated to different users
so as to enhance the robustness of key management.
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2 Paillier’s encryption scheme
Let n = pq be an RSA modulus and φ(n) be the Euler’s totient function. Set λ = lcm(p− 1, q− 1).
Hence, |Z∗n2 | = φ(n
2) = nφ(n) and for any w ∈ Z∗n2
wλ = 1 mod n, wnλ = 1 mod n2
which are due to Carmichael’s theorem.
Definition 1. A number z is said to be a n-th residue modulo n2 if there exists a number
y ∈ Z∗n2 such that z = y
nmod n2.
The set of n-th residues is a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗n2 of order φ(n). Each n-th residue
has exactly n roots, among which exactly one is strictly smaller than n.
Let g be some element of Z∗n2 and define the following integer-valued function
Eg : Zn × Z
∗
n 7−→ Z
∗
n2
(x, y) 7−→ gx · yn mod n2.
Lemma 1. If n | ordn2(g), then Eg is bijective.
Proof. Since the two groups Zn×Z
∗
n and Z
∗
n2 have the same number of elements nφ(n), it suffices
to prove that Eg is injective. Suppose that g
x1yn1 = g
x2yn2 mod n
2, where x1, x2 ∈ Zn, y1, y2 ∈ Z
∗
n.
It comes gx2−x1(y2/y1)
n = 1mod n2, which implies gλ(x2−x1)(y2/y1)
λn = gλ(x2−x1) = 1mod n2.
Thus ordn2(g) |λ(x2 − x1). Since n | ordn2(g), we have n |λ(x2 − x1). In view of that (n, λ) = 1,
we obtain x2 = x1mod n. Since x1, x2 ∈ Zn, it comes x1 = x2. Thus, (y2/y1)
n = 1mod n2, which
leads to the unique solution y2/y1 = 1 over Z
∗
n. This means x1 = x2 and y1 = y2. Therefore, Eg is
bijective. 
By the above lemma, for a given w ∈ Z∗n2 , there exists a pair (x, y) such that w = g
xynmod n2.
Problem 1. Given an RSA modulus n = pq, c, g ∈ Z∗n2, compute x ∈ Z
∗
n such that
gxyn = c mod n2,
where n | ordn2(g) and y is some element of Z
∗
n2.
Theorem 1. If λ is known and (g
λ
−1mod n2
n , n) = 1, then one can solve Problem 1 by computing
x =
(
cλ − 1 mod n2
n
)(
gλ − 1 mod n2
n
)−1
mod n.
Proof. By the definition of λ, it comes cλ = 1mod n, gλ = 1mod n. Set
cλ = an+ 1 mod n2, gλ = bn+ 1 mod n2,
i.e.,
a =
cλ − 1 mod n2
n
, b =
gλ − 1 mod n2
n
.
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Since n | ordn2(g), Eg is bijective. There exists a pair (x, y) ∈ Zn × Z
∗
n such that c = g
xynmod n2.
Hence, cλ = (gxyn)λmod n2. Since ynλ = 1mod n2, it comes cλ = (gλ)xmod n2. Thus,
an+ 1 = (bn+ 1)x = xbn+ 1 mod n2
this is due to n2 |
(x
i
)
(bn)i, i ≥ 2. Therefore, an = xbnmod n2. That means a = xbmod n. Since
(b, n) = 1, it gives x = ab−1mod n. 
Remark 1. Paillier called the Problem 1 as Composite Residuosity Class Problem (see Definition
8 in Ref. [15]). In view of that the trapdoor λ plays a key role in computing the exponent x with
respect to the base g, we would like to call the Problem 1 as Trapdoored Partial Discrete Logarithm
Problem.
Conjecture 1. If the trapdoor λ is unknown, there exists no probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm that solves the Problem 1.
Based on the above results, at Eurocrypt’99 Paillier proposed his cryptosystem. The cryp-
tosystem includes a probabilistic encryption scheme, a one-way trapdoor permutation and a digital
signature scheme. We now describe the encryption scheme as follows.
Table 1: Paillier’s encryption scheme
Setup Pick an RSA modulus n = pq. Set λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1).
Select g ∈ Z∗n2 such that n | ordn2(g).
Publish n, g and keep λ in secret.
Enc. For m ∈ Zn, pick r ∈ Zn, compute the ciphertext
c = gmrnmod n2.
Dec. Recover m =
(
cλ−1mod n2
n
)
/
(
gλ−1mod n2
n
)
mod n
3 A Hybrid Computational Problem
We now consider another computational problem which is a hybrid of partial discrete logarithm
problem and n-th residuosity problem.
Problem 2. Given an RSA modulus n = pq, c, g ∈ Z∗n2, compute (x, y) ∈ Zn × Z
∗
n such that
gxyn = c mod n2
where n | ordn2(g).
Notice that the solvability of Problem 2 directly implies that of Problem 1. We shall prove that
the inverse holds, too.
If the trapdoor λ is known, Paillier proposed a method to solve the hybrid computational
problem. He pointed out that x, y can be computed by
x =
(
cλ − 1 mod n2
n
)(
gλ − 1 mod n2
n
)−1
mod n, y = (cg−x)1/n mod λ mod n.
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The idea behind his method can be described as follows. By the existence of (x, y), it is easy
to find that
gxyn = c mod n2 =⇒ gxyn = c mod n⇐⇒ yn = cg−x mod n
⇐⇒ (yn)1/n mod λ = (cg−x)1/n mod λ mod n
⇐⇒ y = (cg−x)1/n mod λ mod n
By the uniqueness of (x, y) ∈ Zn × Z
∗
n, we conclude that it is properly computed.
Theorem 2. If λ is known and (g
λ
−1mod n2
n , n) = 1, then one can solve Problem 2 by computing
x =
(
cλ − 1 mod n2
n
)(
gλ − 1 mod n2
n
)−1
mod n, y = (cg−x)s mod n,
where s is the integer with the least absolute value such that λ |ns− 1.
Proof. Since (n, λ) = 1, it is easy to compute the integer s with the least absolute value such
that λ |ns−1. By Theorem 1, we conclude that x is properly computed. By the existence of y and
yn = cg−xmod n2, we have
(cg−x)λ = ynλ = 1 mod n2
Now, suppose that ns−1 = λφ and (cg−x)s = ℓn+ymod n2 for some integers φ, ℓ. Hence, it comes
gx
(
(cg−x)s − ℓn
)n
= gx(cg−x)(cg−x)ns−1 = c(cg−x)λφ = c((cg−x)λ)φ = c · 1φ = c mod n2
This completes the proof. 
Note that the values s and
(
gλ−1mod n2
n
)
−1
mod n have no relation to the ciphertext c. They
can be computed and stored previously.
Conjecture 2. If λ is unknown, there exists no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that
solves the Problem 2.
4 The Paillier’s one-way trapdoor permutation and the digital
signature scheme
In Ref. [15], Paillier has put forth a one-way trapdoor permutation and the digital signature scheme
based on his computational method. We now relate them as follows.
Table 2: Paillier’s signature scheme
Setup See Table 1.
Sign
For a message m, compute
s1 ← ρ
(
H(m)λ−1mod n2
n
)
mod n.
s2 ← ((H(m)g
−s1)smod n
The signature is (m; s1, s2).
Verify H(m)
?
= gs1sn2 mod n
2
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Table 3: Paillier’s one-way trapdoor permutation
Setup
Set an RSA modulus n = pq, λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1).
Select g ∈ Z∗n2 such that n | ordn2(g).
Compute ρ =
(
gλ−1mod n2
n
)
−1
mod n, and compute s which is
the integer with the least absolute value such that λ |ns− 1.
Publish n, g and keep λ, ρ, s in secret.
Encryption
Given m ∈ Zn2 , set m = m1 + nm2.
The ciphertext is c← gm1mn2 mod n
2.
Decryption
m1 ← ρ
(
cλ−1mod n2
n
)
mod n, m2 ← (cg
−m1)smod n.
m← m1 + nm2.
Table 4: Some variants of Paillier’s encryption schemes
n = pq is an RSA modulus, λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1).
Variant 1 g ∈ Z∗n2 , ordn2(g) = αn. PK: n, g; SK: α.
(Paillier) m ∈ Zn, r ∈ Zn, c = g
m+rnmod n2.
m =
(
cα−1mod n2
n
)
/
(
gα−1mod n2
n
)
mod n
Variant 2 κ = τλ, τ = λ−1mod n. PK: n; SK: κ.
(Damg˚ard-Jurik) m ∈ Zn, r ∈ Zn, c = (1 +mn)r
nmod n2.
m = c
κ
−1mod n2
n
Variant 3 gλ = 1 + nmod n2. PK: n, g; SK: λ.
(Choi-Choi-Won) m ∈ Zn, r ∈ Zn, c = g
mrnmod n2.
m = c
λ
−1mod n2
n
Variant 4 e < n, d = e−1mod φ(n). PK: n, e; SK: d.
(Catalano-Gennaro m ∈ Zn, r ∈ Zn, c = (1 +mn)r
emod n2.
-Howgrave-Nguyen)
m =
c
(cd mod n)e
−1mod n2
n
5 On some variants of Paillier’s encryption scheme
5.1 Descriptons of some variants
In the same article [15], Paillier has pointed out that there was an efficient variant of his original
encryption scheme. Shortly afterwards, other variants came out [2–4, 7]. We list some variants as
follows.
Correctness of Variant 1. The variant takes x = m, y = gr in Problem 2. Since each n-th
residue has exactly n roots, among which exactly one is strictly smaller than n, and ordn2(g) = αn,
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we have gα = 1mod n. Otherwise, suppose gα = sn + tmod n2 for some integers 0 ≤ s < n and
t (2 ≤ t < n). It leads to
1 = gαn = (sn+ t)n = tn mod n2
which means t = 1. It is a contradiction. Thus, gα = sn+ 1mod n2. By
cα = (gm(gr)n)α = (gα)m = (sn+ 1)m = smn+ 1 mod n2
we have
cα−1 mod n2
n
gα−1 mod n2
n
=
sm
s
= m mod n.
Correctness of Variant 2. The variant takes g = 1+n, x = m, y = r in Problem 2. It is easy
to find that
cκ − 1 mod n2
n
=
((1 + n)mrn)τλ − 1 mod n2
n
=
(1 + n)mτλ − 1 mod n2
n
=
nmτλ mod n2
n
=
nm
n
= m
Correctness of Variant 3. The variant takes x = m, y = r in Problem 2. It is easy to check
that
cλ − 1 mod n2
n
=
(gmrn)λ − 1 mod n2
n
=
(gλ)m − 1 mod n2
n
=
(1 + n)m − 1 mod n2
n
= m
Correctness of Variant 4. It is easy to see that
c
(cd mod n)e
− 1 mod n2
n
=
(1+n)mre
(((1+n)mre)d mod n)e
− 1 mod n2
n
=
(1+n)mre
re − 1 mod n
2
n
= m
5.2 The Bresson-Catalano-Pointcheval encryption scheme revisited
The Bresson-Catalano-Pointcheval encryption scheme has not directly specified that n | ordn2(g).
But it is easy to find that such a picked g satisfies the condition with high probability. In view of
that the condition is necessary to recover x in Problem 1 (see the proof of Theorem 1), we shall
directly specify it in the Setup phase.
The random pad r is chosen by the sender and is blinded as
A = gr mod n2, B = hr(1 +mn) mod n2.
7
We have
A = gr · 1n mod n2,
here it takes x = r, y = 1 in Problem 1. Thus one knowing the trapdoor λ can recover r using
Paillier’s computational method. Note that although B could be viewed as
B = (1 + n)mhr mod n2
it does not fall into the class of Problem 1. One cannot recover r from B whether the trapdoor is
known or not.
After r is retrieved, one can recover m = B/h
r
−1mod n2
n directly. Obviously, the original com-
putational method incurs more cost. Based on the observation, we now present a revision of the
scheme as follows.
Table 5: The Bresson-Catalano-Pointcheval encryption scheme revisited
n = pq, λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). n = pq, λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1).
Setup
α ∈ Z∗n2 , a < nλ/2, g ∈ Z
∗
n2 , n | ordn2(g).
g = α2mod n2, h = gamod n2. a ∈ Z∗n, h = g
amod n2.
ρ =
(
gλ−1mod n2
n
)
−1
mod n. ρ =
(
gλ−1mod n2
n
)
−1
mod n.
τ = λ−1mod n.
PK: n, g, h; SK: a, λ, ρ, τ . PK: n, g, h; SK: a, λ, ρ.
Enc.
For m ∈ Zn, pick r ∈ Zn,
It is the same as the original.
compute A = grmod n2,
B = hr(1 +mn)mod n2.
The ciphertext is c = (A,B).
Dec. 1 m = B/A
a
−1mod n2
n It is the same as the original.
Dec. 2
r = ρ
(
Aλ−1mod n2
n
)
mod n. r = ρ
(
Aλ−1mod n2
n
)
mod n.
γ = armod n.
m =
(
B
gγ
)λ
−1mod n2
n · τ mod n, m =
B/hr−1mod n2
n
We stress that the new alternative decryption method does not invoke the secret parameter
a, which means the secret parameters a, λ, ρ can be divided into two groups, a and (λ, ρ). The
two groups of secret parameters can be allocated to different users so as to enhance the robustness
of key management. The new version is more flexible to be integrated into other cryptographic
schemes.
5.3 Comparisons
The Paillier’s encryption scheme can be naturally transformed into a signature scheme because
it can retrieve the random pad r as well as the message m. This is due to that it only requires
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n | ordn2(g). But in the Variant 1, one cannot retrieve r ∈ Z
∗
n, instead g
rmod n2. Though the
Variant 3 is very similar to the original Paillier’s encryption scheme, it is insecure against a chosen
ciphertext attack [16]. The others, Variant 2, Variant 4 and Variant 5 cannot be transformed into
signature schemes. See the following Table 6 for details.
By the way, the claim that some variants are more efficient than the original Paillier’s encryp-
tion scheme is somewhat misleading. Actually, in Paillier’s encryption scheme the computation(
gλ−1mod n2
n
)
−1
mod n has no relation to the ciphertext c. It can be computed and stored pre-
viously. The dominated computation in the decryption procedure is that c
λ
−1mod n2
n , while the
corresponding computation in Variant 4 is m =
c
(cdmod n)e
−1mod n2
n , and that in Variant 5 is
m = B/A
a
−1mod n2
n . We find these decryptions require almost the same computational cost.
Table 6: Comparisons of Paillier’s encryption and Some variants
The original
c = gmrnmod n2. n | ordn2(g), x = m, y = r.
Verification w.r.t. (m, s1, s2): H(m)
?
= gs1sn2 mod n
2. True.
Variant 1
c = gm(gr)n = gm+rnmod n2.
ordn2(g) = αn, x = m, y = g
r is a special random pad.
Verification w.r.t. (m, s1, s2): H(m)
?
= gs1+s2nmod n2. False.
Variant 2
c = (1 + n)mrn = (1 +mn)rnmod n2.
g = 1 + n, ordn2(g) = n, x = m, y = r
Verification w.r.t. (m, s1, s2): H(m)
?
= (1 + s1n)s
n
2 mod n
2. False.
Variant 3 c = gmrnmod n2. gλ = 1 + n, x = m, y = r
It can not resist a chosen ciphertext attack.
Variant 4
c = (1 +mn)remod n2, g = 1 + n, ed = 1mod φ(n).
Verification w.r.t. (m, s1, s2): H(m)
?
= (1 + s1n)s
e
2mod n
2. False.
Variant 5 (A,B) = (grmod n2, (1 +mn)hrmod n2)
(Bresson-Catalano
-Pointcheval) Verification w.r.t. (m, s1, s2): H(m)
?
= (1 + s1n)h
s2 mod n2. False.
6 Conclusion
We revisit the Paillier’s cryptosystem and present an efficient alternative decryption procedure for
Bresson-Catalano-Pointcheval encryption scheme. We reaffirm that the original Paillier’s encryp-
tion scheme has a special property that it naturally implies a signature scheme, while those variants
miss this feature.
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